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I.  Introduction 
This contribution does not deal with comparative law as an academic discipline, but focuses 
on some of its more practical applications.1 It is well-known that, alongside the scholarly 
pursuit of knowledge of similarities among and differences between legal systems, 
comparative law may also fulfil a role in national legal practice. The most obvious example of 
this is the use of comparative law by national legislatures and courts in creating, reforming 
and interpreting national law.2 This practical use of comparative law by national institutions 
has increased considerably over the last few decades. Particularly in Europe, comparative 
reasoning seems to play an ever larger role in drafting statutes and deciding cases. Still, in 
legal systems that have been mainly national in outlook and character over the last two 
centuries, many aspects of this recourse to foreign law are far from clear. One of the key 
questions is the extent to which it is legitimate for a court to refer to foreign law in a purely 
domestic dispute. While in Europe the drawing of comparative inspiration in such cases is 
usually met with enthusiasm, this is different in the United States, where it is keenly debated 
whether such ‘comparative reasoning’ is allowed, particularly in constitutional cases. 
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In this chapter, the scholarly state of affairs regarding the influence of comparative law in 
national systems is critically assessed. In so doing, emphasis is put on private law and 
constitutional law, as these are the two areas where comparative inspiration is discussed most 
vigorously. The structure is as follows. In sections II. and III., several types of use of 
comparative law by national legislatures and courts are distinguished and various examples of 
such influence are given. This provides the background for a critical evaluation of this 
influence in the subsequent sections. Apart from the legitimacy question and the question of 
how to categorise the different uses of foreign law (both discussed in section IV.), two other 
important points need to be addressed. The first is why a legislature or court actually refers to 
foreign law: is it always to find a better solution or are there more strategic reasons? The 
second is how to explain the different extent to which countries are open to foreign influence. 
Both questions are discussed in section V. It then remains to consider what the exact influence 
of comparative law arguments on the legislature’s or court’s reasoning is. Despite sometimes 
abundant references to foreign law in explanatory memoranda to legislation or in court 
decisions, the true effect of comparative reasoning remains somewhat unclear. By way of a 
summary, section VI. addresses this point. 
II.  Comparative Law and the National Legislatures 
The use of comparative law while drafting new legislation is as old as the phenomenon of 
statutory law itself. It is well known that the law of the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.) was 
influenced by Roman visits to foreign (in particular Greek) cities and even the Code of 
Hammurabi (1,700 B.C.) is presumably based upon the laws then prevailing in the Near East. 
In fact, the modern science of comparative law was primarily provoked by the wish to look at 
foreign law to improve national legislation. This discipline of ‘législation comparée’, as 
propagated by the Société de Législation Comparé (founded in 1869), led to the study of 
foreign codes not only in France but also in other countries. Famous examples of drawing 
inspiration from foreign law are to be found in Germany, where the Prussian company law of 
1843 was partly based upon the French Commercial Code of 1807 and where the large 
nineteenth century unification projects in the areas of private law, procedural law and criminal 
law were inspired by extensive comparative research as well.3 There is also abundant 
evidence of such influence of foreign law on national legislation in other countries. When 
Alan Watson held that the migration of ideas between legal systems is ‘the most fertile source 
of (legal) development’,4 he referred mainly to legislation being adopted by countries other 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=965389
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than those for which it was originally passed. More examples include income tax, which was 
imported from England to the European Continent around 1800, Austrian competition law, 
which formed the basis for the German Kartellgesetz of 1923, the Swedish institution of the 
ombudsman, which was taken over in many countries, and the French Loi Badinter (1985), 
which regulates the compensation of victims of traffic accidents and which was itself based 
upon comparative research and subsequently influenced other European countries’ legislation. 
The wholesale importation of civil codes into other countries is also a well known 
phenomenon. Thus, not only did the French Code civil serve as a model for many countries in 
Europe and South America, the Swiss Civil Code of 1907 was taken over in Turkey (1926), 
and the drafts of the 1900 German Civil Code, together with French law, played a large role in 
the drafting of the Civil Code of Japan (1896). The new civil codes of the Netherlands (1992) 
and Québec (1994), and the new German law of obligations of 2002, were also based upon 
extensive comparative reasoning. Likewise, it is no coincidence that most European countries 
have enacted rather similar laws in the fields of environmental liability, company law, social 
security and family law. Sometimes it seems as if one can meticulously trace the migration of 
an institution from one country to another: thus, same-sex-marriage was first recognised by 
statute in the Netherlands in 2002, subsequently accepted in Belgium and most of the 
Canadian provinces in 2003 (followed by the whole of Canada in 2005), accepted in the state 
of Massachusetts (2004) and Spain (2005), and its introduction is now being discussed in 
many other countries. Of special importance is the influence of Western law on the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: the new codes in the areas of civil, 
commercial and criminal law were usually based upon extensive comparative considerations. 
The same is true for China, which also based its new contract code of 1999 on comparative 
research. 
In most of the above examples, the respective governments had resources available to 
integrate comparative law findings into the drafting of new legislation. In civil law countries 
such as Germany and France this has even become routine: in the drafting of any major new 
statute, the ministry of justice usually looks for inspiration to the laws of other countries. In 
this respect, it sometimes solicits opinions on foreign law from comparative law research 
centres, but not infrequently it relies on research by its own civil servants. This is different in 
many common law jurisdictions, where a ministry of justice in the Continental style does not 
exist.5 However, one cannot say that there is less influence of foreign law on these countries’ 
legal systems, only that such influence takes a different form. In the United Kingdom, it is 
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through the English and Scottish Law Commissions that comparative law finds its way into 
legislation. Section 3(1)(f) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 states that one of the functions 
of the Law Commissions is ‘to obtain such information as to the legal systems of other 
countries as appears to the Commissioners likely to facilitate the performance of any of their 
functions’ (that is: systematically developing and reforming the law of England and Scotland). 
An example is the (English) Law Commission’s report on ‘Privity of Contracts: Contracts for 
the Benefit of Third Parties’. It not only discussed the laws of other common law 
jurisdictions, but also stated that a factor in support of reform of the third party rule in English 
law was that ‘the legal systems of most of the member states of the European Union recognise 
and enforce the rights of third party beneficiaries under contracts.’6 The report led in the end 
to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
In the United States, the American Law Institute (founded in 1932) makes use of comparative 
law in drafting the Restatements of Law. Model codes (like the Model Penal Code) are also 
inspired by other legal systems, and even in the field of competition law the federal legislature 
benefited from European experience in reviewing the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.7 
Generally speaking, however, the American debate is less enlightened by foreign law than is 
the case in Europe: reference to foreign law is made, but it seems to play a less important role 
than in European countries. This may be linked to the fact that inter-state comparison (i.e. 
among the fifty three American jurisdictions) is much more important than comparison with 
legal systems outside the United States. ‘The American common law’, as Zaphiriou states, 
‘contains contrasts that are almost as instructive and often more constructive than any 
comparison with the law of a foreign country’8 
When confronted with these examples, one can only agree with Schlesinger:9 little new 
legislation is enacted, in Europe and elsewhere, without at least some comparative research, 
and every legal system contains imported elements. The above examples raise several 
questions. One is what the exact influence of the comparative argument has been on new 
legislation: it is often very difficult to establish the extent to which foreign law was decisive 
for the way in which a national statute was drafted. Same-sex-marriage offers a good example 
of this: the mere fact that the Dutch recognised this type of marriage in a statute is not likely 
to have played as important a role as prevailing societal and cultural opinion in the Belgian, 
Canadian and Spanish decisions to adopt this institution as well. In other words: these 
‘importing’ countries would probably have accepted same-sex-marriage even without the 
Dutch example. It is also important to note that the most common way in which foreign law 
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permeates national law is through national legal writing; for often legal academics take up a 
point from some foreign legal system, make it part of the national discourse and thus bring it 
to the notice of the legislatures of their respective countries. Ludwig Raiser’s book on 
standard contract terms of 1935,10 based upon comparative considerations, was received in 
German doctrine and this in turn influenced the German legislature to introduce, in 1976, a 
special statutory regime on this topic. 
In the literature on comparative inspiration of the legislature, one finds few attempts to 
categorize different types of foreign influence. One may distinguish between the wholesale 
importation of large pieces of law (like a complete civil code) and the adoption of specific 
rules. One might also distinguish between the voluntary and mandatory borrowing of foreign 
law. In instances of mandatory borrowing a state is obliged to adopt a foreign statute, as in the 
case of the importation of a civil code by way of colonization or conquest. In most cases, 
however, the national legislature’s reasons for drawing inspiration from foreign law are far 
more subtle; indeed, they may not differ fundamentally from those explaining why national 
courts look at foreign law. These reasons are being explored in section V, infra. 
III.  Comparative Law and the National Courts 
1.  Introduction 
A national court making use of foreign materials is often considered to be far more exciting 
than a national legislature doing the same thing. The reason for this is probably that in the 
traditional view a court, unlike the legislature, has to apply national law, not to create it. At 
the same time, however, this statement makes clear that there can be very good reasons for a 
court to look at foreign law, in particular where national law does not offer a solution to the 
case at hand, either because the applicable rule is unclear or because there is no rule available 
at all. It is the famous Art. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code which relates the task of the court to that 
of the legislature by stating that: 
If no relevant provisions can be found in a statute, the judge must decide in accordance with 
customary law, and, in its absence, according to the rule which he would, were he the legislator, adopt. 
In so doing he must pay attention to accepted doctrine and tradition. 
In principle, this opens up the national debate to foreign influence and in Swiss practice the 
Bundesgericht does indeed often refer to comparative law in difficult cases. In other countries 
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courts are more reluctant to do so, but there, too, the use of comparative law by courts is on 
the rise. 
Before an overview of national court practice in respect of this ‘voluntary’ or ‘optional’ 
recourse to foreign law is given, it is useful to remember that there are also cases in which it is 
mandatory, or highly desirable, for a court to look at law of foreign origin.11 The most 
obvious example is when conflict of laws rules oblige the court simply to apply another 
country’s legal system, for example because of a choice of law by the contracting parties. But 
it can also be that private international law requires some sort of comparison with the court’s 
own national law, as in cases of qualification: if a foreign rule that does not have an 
equivalent in the forum state needs to be applied, it must first be compared with the law of the 
lex fori.12 Another example in which a court is obliged to compare legal systems with each 
other is offered by Arts. 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention of 1980,13 which protect the 
consumer and the worker by offering them the minimum protection of their own legal system 
in cases where a less favourable legal system is declared to be applicable. And since Art. 
288(2) EC-Treaty on the delictual liability of the European Union and its agents prescribes 
that this liability is to be determined ‘in accordance with the general principles common to the 
laws of the member states’, the court can only derive such principles from a comparison of the 
laws of the member states. 
There are also cases in which a court is not required to take account of foreign law, but in 
which it seems highly desirable to do so. This is the position if the field of law is so 
international that reference to foreign authorities is natural. Obvious examples are maritime 
law and transportation law, both of which are greatly influenced by international treaties. If 
national law is based upon such a treaty, a proper ‘uniform’ interpretation should take into 
account the way in which other countries implement its provisions. Many treaties14 therefore 
state that the international character of the treaty is to be taken into account in interpreting its 
provisions. The same is true for the interpretation of European law: even though it is the 
European Court of Justice that is to supervise the proper interpretation of EC law, the 
contribution by national courts in interpreting provisions of national law based on European 
legislation in a European spirit is vital. Finally, there is an extra reason to look at foreign law 
if a statute has a foreign origin. The idea behind the American ‘borrowed statute’ doctrine, 
which allows a court to interpret the statute in accordance with the foreign source, is also 
accepted in many other countries. Thus, Australia adopted a constitution after the American 
model and Australian courts are therefore keen to look at American law when interpreting it. 
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2.  Voluntary Recourse to Foreign Law in Domestic Disputes 
When the influence of comparative law on national courts is discussed, it is often the 
voluntary use of foreign law in purely domestic disputes that forms the centre of attention. 
There are now examples of such influence in almost every legal system, even though 
important differences between various countries are to be appreciated. Concerning this 
voluntary recourse to foreign law, it should always be kept in mind that it is a ‘luxurious’ 
form of legal analysis15 that cannot be expected from every judge. One may even wonder 
whether it is permitted. Some countries (particularly in South America) explicitly prohibit the 
application of foreign law, while in other (mostly European) countries it is not formally 
forbidden but not done very often. The truth is that recourse to foreign law is not so much the 
application of a foreign legal regime in a national context, but usually only the taking over of 
a foreign argument if it fits in with the national legal system and if this is found necessary. It 
is thus of persuasive rather than formal authority.16 
When is there a need in a domestic dispute to find persuasive authority elsewhere? The 
reasons already mentioned – national law has a lacuna or is unclear – are not completely 
convincing as these problems have always existed and can also be solved within the purely 
national context by using techniques which courts have used time and again. The increasing 
use of comparative arguments has more to do with the growing feeling among many (in 
particular supreme) courts that it may be counter-productive not to benefit from foreign 
experience. This is all the more so if similar problems arise in different countries. 
Koopmans17 points out that many countries face identical legal problems caused by the 
pollution of air, water and soil, new (bio-)technology, an emerging claim culture, migration, 
urban decay, etc. For a variety of reasons, political institutions often do not enact legislation 
to deal with these problems, thus leaving a large burden on the courts. 
It is therefore no surprise that most cases in which a court looks at foreign law18 concern 
controversial new issues for which no solution can be found in the existing national law (be it 
statute or precedent). Thus, the question whether ‘immaterial damages’ should be awarded in 
cases of infringement of privacy (which at the time was denied by the German Civil Code) 
was answered affirmatively by the highest German civil and constitutional courts, and by both 
of them with reference to foreign law.19 In the Netherlands it was debated whether damages 
for pain and suffering may be allowed at all, a question on which the civil code was silent at 
the time. The Dutch Supreme Court awarded damages, also drawing upon the law of 
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neighbouring countries.20 Likewise, the question whether actions for wrongful birth or 
wrongful life should be allowed was answered in the 1980s and 1990s by highest courts 
throughout the world, most of them making use of the decisions of their foreign colleagues.21 
Furthermore, in deciding whether land rights should be given to aboriginals the Australian 
High Court relied heavily on arguments taken from other legal systems, citing fourteen cases 
in favour of its decision, only three of which were Australian.22 The same is true for the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which made extensive use of American case law in deciding which 
rights aboriginals should have.23 In South Africa and in the United States foreign material has 
been used to analyse arguments for and against the death sentence.24 
One should not derive from these examples the conclusion that voluntary recourse to foreign 
law is now common in controversial cases. It is far from that. There are many cases that do 
not refer to foreign law at all, even though this would have been fruitful and legal counsel 
explicitly referred to it. In this respect, it may be useful to look at four countries in more 
detail. France, Germany, England and the United States differ considerably in the extent to 
which their courts take foreign law into account when deciding purely domestic cases. 
In Germany it is not uncommon for the highest court to refer to foreign law in order to 
support its arguments, but the number of cases in which this actually happens is limited. Not 
surprisingly, most of the references are to other countries within the Germanic legal family, 
such as Switzerland and Austria, and there are only a few cases in which English, American 
or French law is cited. Some examples in the field of private law were already given above. In 
criminal law, the German Supreme Court decided that statements made by a defendant during 
a police interview were not admissible as evidence if the defendant had not been informed of 
his right to remain silent and of his right to legal representation. In doing so, the Court 
referred to the famous American case of Miranda v. Arizona of 1966 and to French, English 
and Dutch law.25 
The situation in France is very different. In French case law there are hardly any references to 
foreign law. This is not surprising as the decisions of the French Cour de Cassation in 
particular are not extensively reasoned and usually do not even contain references to French 
case law or legal doctrine. The same is true for the Netherlands and Belgium, where the 
sparse references to foreign law are only in the most general terms (for example that the 
outcome is in accordance with legislation and case law in neighbouring countries). One 
should however be careful not to draw the general conclusion that foreign law has no 
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influence at all on the court’s reasoning in these countries. In civil law countries which have a 
system of Advocates-General who advise the Supreme Court, it is in the opinion (conclusion) 
of the Advocate-General that one often finds elaborate comparative considerations. In many 
cases the decision of the court can be related to parts of the Advocate-General’s opinion, 
although it is, of course, difficult to accept a clear relationship between foreign law and the 
court’s decision if the court does not make an explicit reference to the corresponding part of 
the Advocate-General’s opinion.26 But sometimes the influence cannot be coincidental: in a 
decision of 1991, the French Cour de Cassation27 held that Art. 1384 of the Code Civil 
entailed a general liability for other people’s acts. In 1920, the Privy Council had applied the 
same reasoning in a Québec decision on the similar provision of the Québec Civil Code. This 
decision probably influenced part of French legal doctrine, which in turn influenced the 
Advocate-General in the Cour de Cassation case. This led, in the end, to the court’s following 
its Advocate-General and thus, indirectly, the law of Québec. 
The most spectacular development has taken place in England in this respect. It was, and still 
is, common for an English court to refer to other common law jurisdictions: thus, even after 
the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, English law influenced Australian and Canadian 
law (and vice versa). This is quite logical in view of the shared legal heritage in these 
countries, which makes it even difficult to say whether a specific rule is ‘foreign’. Although 
during the nineteenth century, and particularly in the field of contract law, civil law exerted 
quite a strong influence on the common law, during the twenieth century it became almost 
unheard of to derive arguments from civil law countries. Even in 1978 Lord Diplock stated 
that it would not be consistent with English law ‘to attempt to incorporate holus-bolus from 
some other system of law, even so close as that of Scotland, doctrines or legal concepts that 
have hitherto been unrecognized in English common law’.28 At best, civil law was mentioned 
in passing when brought to the attention of the court and certainly did not guide the court’s 
decision.29 But this changed in the 1990s, a period described by Lord Bingham as ‘the time 
when England … ceased to be a legal island.’30 The turning point was the decision of the 
House of Lords in White v. Jones.31 A testator had asked his solicitor to change his will to the 
benefit of some of his descendants. The solicitor failed to execute these instructions before the 
testator died. The intended beneficiaries were successful in claiming their loss from the 
solicitor. In his leading speech, Lord Goff relied heavily on comparative law arguments from 
civil law systems (in particular German law), even though these arguments were not directly 
influential for the outcome.32 The case was followed by several others in which comparative 
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reasoning played an even larger role, such as in Greatorex v. Greatorex33, in which the High 
Court allowed a claim for psychiatric damage on the basis of arguments derived from a 
similar German case, and Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services,34 in which the normal 
rules of causation were not applied in a case where a person suffering from a disease caused 
by exposure to asbestos dust would otherwise not have been able to show which of several 
employers had caused his illness. Alongside common law authority, the House of Lords 
quoted civil law sources from Germany, Norway, France and the Netherlands. Sometimes the 
House of Lords also refers to a lack of international consensus, as in the Pretty case35 where 
the right to assisted suicide was denied. 
It is clear that references to civil law cases by the House of Lords are usually based on legal 
literature and not so much on a reading of the foreign cases themselves: it is through the 
‘filter’ of comparative literature36 that foreign law enters a decision. In the wrongful birth case 
of McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board, the House of Lords referred to precedents from civil 
law systems, basing itself on the Ius Commune casebook on tort law37 and other literature. It 
is quite likely that the growing interest in foreign law among English courts would not have 
originated without such comparative legal literature.  
In the United States foreign law does not play an important role in court decisions. Although 
in the past there have been considerable civil law influences on American law, in particular in 
the early nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries as a result of émigré lawyers who influenced 
legal practice through their writings,38 the present situation can be characterised as parochial. 
On the whole, the conclusion which Levasseur drew in 1999 still stands: with the exception of 
Louisiana, ‘the relevance of foreign … comparative law in American courts is almost nil.’39 
This is not to say that there are no examples of state courts or of the United States Supreme 
Court referring to foreign law; in the field of constitutional law there are even signs indicating 
a significant change. A famous old example is Muller v. Oregon,40 in which the Supreme 
Court had to decide the constitutionality of Oregon’s ‘maximum hours for women’ law. 
Counsel for the state of Oregon was the later Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis; he 
referred to a whole range of foreign statutes (including those of France, Germany, Austria, 
Italy and the Netherlands) that restricted the working hours of women. Justice Brewer did not 
consider these to be authorities in a technical sense, but did consider them to be ‘significant of 
a widespread belief that woman’s physical structure, and the functions she performs in 
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consequence thereof, justify special legislation …’. In Roe v. Wade41 Justice Blackmun also 
referred to historical and comparative materials on abortion. 
As to the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
comparative reasoning is on the rise. The Amendment prohibits ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’. There are now several cases in which the Supreme Court refers to international 
opinion to find out what is a cruel and unusual punishment in view of ‘the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’. In the 2005 case of Roper v. 
Simmons42, for example, the Court held that the execution of offenders who were under the 
age of eighteen when they committed their crimes was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
The majority of the Court found confirmation for its view in the fact that executing juveniles 
violated several international treaties and that ‘the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion [was] against the juvenile death penalty’. This reliance on foreign materials provoked 
fierce reactions that may be typical of the American attitude vis-à-vis foreign law. I will come 
back to this in section IV., infra. 
This short survey reveals that the exact role of the reference to foreign law in a purely 
domestic case is often not very clear. The above evidence merely suggests that courts (like 
legislatures) do sometimes refer to foreign law, but we are in need of an analytical structure to 
categorise these cases and to explain why these references, by both courts and legislatures, are 
justified. These questions are addressed in the next section. 
IV.  The Legitimacy of Comparative Law Influence: Why Comparative Inspiration? 
1.  A Categorization of Types of Comparative Influence 
Legislatures and courts can make use of comparative law for a variety of reasons. It seems 
useful to distinguish these into three different groups, whilst recognising that this is not the 
only possible categorization. In the American literature in particular one can find a whole 
range of possible categorizations, ranging from the very practical to the very sophisticated. 
Thus, Tushnett makes a distinction between functionalism, expressivism and bricolage,43 and 
Choudry distinguishes between universalist, dialogical and genealogical comparative 
interpretation.44 The distinction adopted here is a more practical one, based on the criterion of 
whether or not the legislature or the court uses foreign law as a normative argument. 
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Firstly, legislatures and courts can make use of comparative law as a source of fresh ideas 
and, particularly, in order to find a solution to a given problem. It is this type of reasoning that 
comes closest to the idea of comparative inspiration, of comparative law as a means for the 
legislature or the court to inform itself about other countries’ solutions and to gather ideas 
from this ‘fund’. Thus, the legislature may want to know which new topics to address; or if it 
does already know the topics to be placed on the legislative agenda, it may want know how to 
draft rules to address the issues which they raise; or, if it does already know how to draft such 
rules, it may want to know how they will operate in practice. In all these cases foreign law 
may offer inspiration. Similarly a court that does not know how to solve a case, how to 
interpret a national rule, or how to deal with a certain argument, may look for inspiration 
elsewhere. There is no need for the legislature or court to give any justification for looking at 
foreign law at this stage. Often the use of foreign law will be ‘hidden’45 in the sense that it 
does not show in the explanatory memorandum or in the court decision. In other cases the fact 
that foreign law has been consulted will be mentioned ‘in passing’. But this is not important 
because no normative weight is attached to the foreign law. 
Secondly, legislatures and courts may refer to foreign law as a normative argument. This 
means that foreign law plays a role in justifying a court decision or a statute: it is at least one 
factor which favours a particular result. It is of course not the only such factor: its importance 
is still to be decided and it may well be that the comparative argument is overridden by others, 
with the result that the foreign example is not followed. 
There are two types of such ‘normative’ use of foreign law. It may be that foreign experience 
is looked to as an illustration of how a certain rule is applied in practice, turning foreign 
experience into an empirical argument for the legislature or court. When the American 
Supreme Court decided against the legality of assisted suicide,46 it took the Dutch experience 
into account and considered the (albeit contested) evidence that the Dutch guidelines had in 
practice failed to protect patients from involuntary euthanasia. Annus rightly observes that 
foreign countries may thus serve as a laboratory:47 their experiences may help legislatures and 
courts to avoid mistakes made elsewhere, and possibly also to convince a national audience of 
the utility of a foreign institution. In this respect, it was helpful that countries wanting to 
introduce the ombudsman could point to the success of the Swedish example. 
But it may also be that the content of foreign law itself is a normative argument to adopt a 
certain solution. In such cases, foreign law contributes directly to the court decision or 
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legislation and thus possesses authority for the court or the legislature: it is because a 
particular solution has been adopted elsewhere that the court or legislature wants to do the 
same. This argument may still have to be balanced against others, but it does have normative 
weight as an authority-based argument. The best examples of such ‘hard’ use48 of foreign law 
are cases in which a certain international consensus, or a foreign solution, is explicitly used as 
an argument for adopting the same solution at the national level. The argument then is simply 
that the mere fact that the world community, or a foreign state, adopted a particular solution is 
(co-)decisive for the outcome in one’s own country. The American cases on the proper 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment are – highly criticized – examples of this approach. 
Another example is the case law of the various courts within the Commonwealth in which a 
solution is sometimes adopted because it is in line with the law of other jurisdictions. This 
type of argument functions at the same level as the argument that a certain outcome is in line 
with legal history and should therefore be adopted. 
It is not always easy to establish whether a legislature or a court uses foreign law as a 
normative argument. Often, the method of reasoning is far more subtle because it is not the 
foreign decision or statute as such that is used as the basis for the reasoning, but rather the 
argument used in it which is taken over by the national court or legislature. Adopting the 
underlying reasoning may, however, be characterised as falling under the first category of the 
use of foreign material, i.e. its use as a source of inspiration. In most of the examples 
discussed above under the heading of voluntary recourse to foreign law by courts, this is what 
has happened. But as soon as legislatures or courts use foreign law to control an outcome on 
the basis of ‘national’ arguments, they do use foreign law in the normative sense.49 And this is 
in fact how foreign law is used in many cases. In the Fairchild case50, for example, Lord 
Bingham stated that: 
 if … a decision is given in this country which offends one’s basic sense of justice, and if 
consideration of international sources suggests that a different and more acceptable decision would be 
given in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this must prompt anxious review of the 
decision in question. 
Thirdly, foreign law can be used for ‘ornamental purposes’.51 If references to foreign law are 
used in explanatory memoranda or court decisions without any visible connection with the 
statute or court decision, such references are obviously superfluous. They demonstrate the 
learning of civil servants or judges, but do no more than that. The drafters of the new Dutch 
Civil Code of 1992, and in particular its original draftsman, Eduard M. Meijers, took pride in 
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citing the (black letter) law of more than forty countries (including the civil codes of Brazil, 
Egypt and Chile), but the exact relationship of these citations with the adoption of a particular 
rule often remained unclear. The normative weight of such ornamental references is nil, but 
there can be other reasons why they are used. Thus, they may contribute to the draftsmans’s 
prestige: by demonstrating his learning in the field of comparative law, the draftsman can try 
to convince others (like Parliament) of the high quality of his work in general. 
2.  The Legitimacy of Comparative Reasoning 
The question whether it is legitimate for a national legislature or court to undertake voluntary 
comparative reasoning only arises when foreign law is used as a normative argument (the 
second type of use of foreign law described in the previous subsection). It has not been 
discussed very often in the European literature. The obvious answer is that the use of foreign 
law is permissible as it would be counter-productive to deal with a (new) problem without 
taking into account the experiences elsewhere. This answer presupposes that law is not 
national in nature, but that there is an international common ‘fund’ of solutions from which 
anyone may draw. Both Portalis and von Savigny knew this: they were convinced that a 
national code needed to be based on a legal scholarship which was not limited to national 
materials; and that while interpreting such a code it would be important to benefit from a 
European legal scholarship.52 In their times, the international stock of solutions was made up 
largely of Roman law, but that does not matter. What does matter is finding a good solution, 
which does not depend on the nationality of the respective legal system. If this argument is 
taken to its extreme, it leads to Konrad Zweigert’s far-reaching idea of comparative law as a 
‘universal method of interpretation’: even in cases where clear national rules are available, 
these rules should be interpreted in line with foreign law.53 
We should be aware that, underlying this view, there must be some more fundamental reason 
why it is legitimate to regard foreign authority as important. In fact, there are two such 
reasons. Firstly, one may find an argument in the promotion of uniformity. If one sees the 
attainment of uniform law as a desirable goal, the justification of the use of comparative 
reasoning by legislatures and courts is that it may help to achieve this aim. The former 
president of the German Federal Supreme Court, Walter Odersky, wrote that ‘the national 
court is entitled to take note of the fact that a particular solution is conducive to the 
harmonization of European law. … It is an argument that he should use with increasing 
frequency as the integration of Europe proceeds.’54 This is a strong argument: it fits in with 
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the idea that competition of legal systems is one of the best ways to promote uniformity 
without, at the same time, sacrificing national legal culture, and that of the protagonists of 
legal development the courts are best able to perform this job.55 
There is a second reason that may explain the legitimacy of using foreign law in a national 
context.56 It is that all legal systems share the common goal of finding and applying the best 
and most just legal rules. All legal systems try to approximate this goal, and it is likely that 
some of them will have succeeded earlier or more convincingly than others. This means that it 
is useful to compare the solutions reached elsewhere with domestic solutions in order to 
develop one’s own law in accordance with that of other legal systems. Essentially this 
justification is based on the theory of Natural law. Legal rules are treated as if they are all cut 
from a universal cloth and each court is trying to identify the same set of norms.57 The 
argument is particularly strong in the context of human rights, but it may also be extended to 
private law. In the debate on European harmonization of private law there is an important line 
of thought taking this view as a (sometimes implicit) starting point: legal diversity is merely 
coincidental and the main task of European legal scholarship is to unveil the principles that 
European legal systems have in common. 
It is important to note that both theories are based on the idea that national laws are not 
something unique. This view is as contested in the United States as it is popular in Europe. 
The argument against the value of comparative reasoning is best presented by the United 
States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote extrajudicially:58 
We judges of the American democracies are servants of our peoples, sworn to apply … the laws that 
those peoples deem appropriate. We are not some international priesthood empowered to impose upon 
our free and independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own.  
In other words: courts have to apply national law. In particular the national constitution is an 
expression of a uniquely national character and courts should help to constitute the nation by 
respecting this character.59 When the United States’ Supreme Court had to decide about the 
constitutionality of the death penalty for juvenile delinquents in Roper v. Simmons (see 
section III., supra), the reference to international opinion by a majority of the court (‘The 
United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death 
penalty’) as a confirmation of a national consensus was fiercely attacked by Scalia. In a 
dissenting opinion he rejected the use of international or foreign law with the following 
words: 
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I do not believe that the meaning of … our Constitution should be determined by the subjective views 
of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners … . ‘Acknowledgement’ of foreign 
approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court … .  
The decision of the Court even led to a proposal by some Republican congressmen for a 
‘Constitution Restoration Act’, prohibiting an American court from relying upon any foreign 
law in interpreting and applying the Constitution.60 It should be added that, on this view, 
drawing inspiration from foreign material is less problematic for the legislature. In Printz v. 
United States, Justice Scalia said that ‘comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.’61 
This is quite logical as in a democratic society the legislature is permitted to do what a court 
cannot do: to implement whatever legal rule it chooses, and on whatever basis.  
It is clear that there is a fundamental difference between Europe and the United States in 
valuing the role of foreign law. It is too easy simply to refer to American ‘parochialism’ and 
to the European belief in ‘universality’ in order to explain this difference. There must be 
underlying reasons why some countries invoke foreign law more readily than others. These 
reasons are discussed in the next section. 
V.  Motives, Strategies and Differences among Countries in Valuing Foreign Law 
1. Introduction 
There are still two questions which need to be answered. The first is why a legislature or a 
court voluntarily refers to foreign law. Obviously in most of the well-known examples of 
voluntary use of foreign law, the court or the legislature would have reached the same result 
had it not referred to foreign law. Lord Goff’s speech in White v. Jones is usually considered 
to be one of the highlights of comparative reasoning in English law, but it has been sceptically 
remarked that the decision was, in the end, purely based on English law.62 It is a truism that 
gaps or unclear rules in national law can always be, and in the past often were, remedied other 
than by reference to foreign solutions. This suggests that the use of comparative law 
arguments often has not so much to do with substance as with other motives. It seems useful 
to pay attention to these motives. 
The second, related, question is how to explain the differing extents to which various 
countries are open to foreign influence. Why is it that some legislatures and courts engage 
more readily in comparative reasoning than others? It was made clear above that American 
 - 17 - 
courts are less open to foreign influence than English or German courts. Countries like Turkey 
and Japan were once willing to import foreign civil codes, but are now far less receptive. How 
can this be explained? 
2.  Motives and Strategies in Comparative Reasoning 
There is a large literature which attempts to explain legal transplants in general. Most of this 
literature is about why national legislatures take over foreign law. Without going into 
details,63 there seems to be a consensus that the legislature often borrows law for reasons 
other than mere inspiration or the mere quality of a foreign rule. 
One reason is that it simply saves time and money to use a solution which is already in 
operation abroad. A frequent example of such a ‘cost-saving transplant’ is the adoption by 
developing countries of Western environmental or health and safety legislation. In the end it is 
simply efficiency and not the search for the ‘best’ rule that is decisive: it saves (information) 
costs to adopt something which has been proved to work elsewhere. Another reason for a 
country’s legislature to take over foreign law can be that it adds to the ‘prestige’ of that 
country in the rest of the world. That is why developing countries often introduce human 
rights charters into their constitutions, even if these are not complied with in practice. 
The most important reason for a country to take over foreign law, however, is that it is often 
more or less compelled to do so: the adoption of a foreign model can be made a condition for 
giving loans (as is the case with the International Monetary Fund) or for granting political 
autonomy. Western countries often make their financial aid to the Third World dependent on 
the respect for human rights. After the Second World War General Douglas MacArthur 
imposed a Western-based constitution on Japan; Eastern European countries, on the other 
hand, faced a ‘Sovietization’ of law. In both cases this was part of a policy to ‘assist’ these 
countries to adapt to a prevailing ideology. In the 1990s Russia abolished the (execution of 
the) death penalty so as to be able to join the Council of Europe. Such ‘dictation’ can also be 
far more subtle. Many European countries have adopted legislation for new types of contracts 
such as franchising, leasing and factoring. In doing so, they created legal certainty for 
contracting parties who wanted to base their dealings on these new contractual concepts 
developed in American law. There was thus an economic interest to borrow from a foreign 
system. When China adopted its new Contract Code in 1999, it did so to enhance the market 
economy by attracting foreign investment. In today’s world, political and economic pressure 
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and commercial dominance are far more important explanations for legal transplants than the 
mandatory adoption of foreign institutions. 
Unlike legislatures, courts are not primarily driven by political or economic considerations. It 
may be that courts look elsewhere for inspiration in cases, where there is either no domestic 
rule or the domestic rule is unclear, because they think that this will save time and money or 
will provide prestige, but it is probable that there is also a different mechanism at work. As 
was mentioned in section III., courts are particularly keen to refer to foreign law when they 
have to deal with a controversial new issue. It is likely that the more controversial or novel an 
issue is, the more the court feels obliged to convince its audience of the correctness of its 
decision. To convince outside observers that its decision is correct, the court can seek support 
in legal systems where a similar issue has been decided before. Thus, courts can use 
references to foreign law strategically to improve the acceptance of their decisions by the 
legal community of their own country. 
This thesis was advanced by Walsh, and tested by Smithey, for Canadian and South African 
constitutional law.64 Both Canada (in 1982) and South Africa (in 1996) adopted a new charter 
of fundamental rights and created a system of constitutional control by the courts. Both 
countries lacked any tradition in constitutional review, and yet the Supreme Court of Canada 
and the Constitutional Court of South Africa have had to decide very controversial cases, such 
as on the ‘horizontal effect’ of the new constitution in relationships among citizens, or the 
acceptability of the death penalty. Justice Beverly McLachlin of the Canada Supreme Court 
put it like this: ‘Consider … the sinking feeling that besets a common lawyer upon finding 
himself or herself confronted by a new document, an amalgam of unfamiliar American and 
European and who-knows-what-other ideas, without so much as a case to show the way.’65 
This is why Section 39 of the South African Constitution explicitly declares that courts ‘may 
consider foreign law’ when interpreting the Bill of Rights. In post-apartheid South Africa 
reference to foreign law also served the purpose of showing the world that the country was 
able to catch up with international human rights standards. Walsh’s thesis was indeed 
supported by evidence: in the first 75 cases decided by the two courts, abundant reference was 
made to foreign law. The Canadian court cited foreign precedents in 64% of the cases and the 
South African court even in 68%.66 
The idea that legal uncertainty produces greater reliance on external sources also seems to be 
evidenced by most of the private law cases mentioned in the previous sections. When there is 
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no guidance in national law, the use of foreign law increases, but as soon as one knows how 
to deal with an issue, the need to find guidance abroad is less obvious and reliance upon 
foreign law decreases again. A study in which this thesis is empirically tested for countries 
other than Canada and South Africa is still lacking. 
We should, however, not forget that this motive does not explain everything. Often, the 
influence of foreign law is a result of coincidence. The most famous example is probably the 
introduction of the Swiss Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure of the canton of 
Neuchâtel in Turkey in 1926. It is safe to say that this would not have happened if the then 
Turkish minister of justice had not studied law in Neuchâtel. In a similar vein, without the 
influence of German émigré lawyers like Friedrich Kessler, Albert Ehrenzweig and Stefan 
Riesenfeld, American contract law would have looked different. Likewise, if Andreas von 
Tuhr had not taught law at various German universities, his textbook on the Swiss law of 
obligations, and, indeed, Swiss law itself, would not have been as greatly influenced by 
German law as it is today.67 As far as courts are concerned, much depends on legal counsel, or 
on the judges’ linguistic knowledge, or on the availability of a good library. 
3. Differences in the Extent to which Different Legal Systems are Open to Foreign 
Influence 
How may the differences in the extent to which various legal systems are open to foreign 
influence be explained? As far as legislation is concerned, several factors have already been 
mentioned above: apart from political and economic considerations, the extent to which the 
legislature of a particular country has access to comparative materials plays an important role. 
If the drafting of legislation is left to a special branch of government or to a Law Commission, 
these bodies can make it a matter of course to refer to comparative law. This may partly 
explain why foreign materials play a less important role in American legislative practice: 
comparative resources are often not available at the state level, and at the federal level all 
energy is put into comparing the fifty three American jurisdictions. The differences in court 
practice are caused by similar factors. The aim of this section is to identify some of them. 
A first factor is the amount of national materials available. We just saw that a court is more 
likely to refer to foreign law if the question before it does not receive a clear answer in 
national law. As a consequence, the more material that is available within the court’s own 
jurisdiction, the less likely it is that the court will need to refer to foreign law. ‘New’ 
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questions are simply less frequent in large jurisdictions. This may explain why foreign law 
does not play a large role in deciding cases in the United States, with its enormous amount of 
case law. The theory is confirmed by the experience of small countries such as Luxemburg, 
where courts are obliged to refer to foreign law far more often.68 
It is important to note that the greater the sense of national lawyers that they are part of some 
larger legal tradition, the bigger the chance that they will refer to countries which are also part 
of that tradition. This is very obvious within the British Commonwealth. As noted above, the 
laws of the Commonwealth countries are widely seen to belong to one and the same tradition, 
which means that cases from other jurisdictions within the Commonwealth are frequently 
cited. In R v. Kingston, Lord Mustill said: ‘In the absence of guidance from English 
authorities it is useful to inquire how other common law jurisdictions have addressed the same 
problem. …’.69 Typically, an English judge once apologized to his New Zealand friends for 
using the word ‘foreign’ when referring to New Zealand law.70 This point is confirmed by 
statistical analyses. Between 1983 and 1994, 85% of the foreign cases referred to by 
Australian courts were English cases.71 In England, approximately 70% of the references to 
foreign law concerned common law jurisdictions.72 In a similar vein, though on a much 
smaller scale, Austrian and Greek courts often seem to be inspired by German law. If the 
Swiss Bundesgericht cites foreign law, in 90% of cases it is German law.73 
Frequent recourse to foreign law may be expected in mixed jurisdictions. Thus, Scottish and 
South African courts are able, in principle, to rely on materials from both the civil law and the 
common law traditions in finding the best solution to a problem. This is consistent with what, 
for example, the Scottish judge Lord Cooper of Culross said about drawing inspiration from 
abroad.74 However, statistics show that the reality is different. Between 1920 and 1997, 25% 
of the case law cited in judgments of the Scottish Court of Session was English. Only 5% of 
the case law cited was of other origin, most of it probably coming from common law 
jurisdictions. The only change since 1997 seems to be that the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights is increasingly cited.75 
A second factor which explains differences between courts has to do with the political 
constellation of a country. As mentioned above, courts in countries undergoing political 
transition seek to legitimize their decisions by reference to case law of more experienced 
courts. This is what happened in South Africa and Canada. It is likely that the general lesson 
to be learnt from this is that young constitutional courts engage more readily in comparative 
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reasoning than more established ones. This can be part of a strategy to convince the legal 
community that a legal system is distancing itself from the past. This need not be a past of 
human rights violations, as was the case in South Africa. When Australia finally abolished 
appeal to the Privy Council in 1986, this was part of a desire to develop an autonomous 
Australian law. It was obvious that ‘autonomy’ in this context meant first and foremost 
autonomy from England. As a result, Australian courts began to cite other foreign sources 
more often than before. A similar development can be expected in Scotland, where, as a result 
of devolution, the civil law aspect of its legal system may be emphasized more strongly than 
in the past, simply to demonstrate its independence from England. 
As a third factor, it should be mentioned that the receptiveness in Europe towards comparative 
law arguments increased because of the process of Europeanization.76 It is not only the 
influence of the European Convention on Human Rights, and EC law, or of the ‘transnational 
law explosion’ as such, that has led to a Europeanization of national law. Perhaps even more 
important is the fact that the process of European integration provoked a profound interest in 
the law of other countries generally. The European Court of Justice itself shows the way as it 
often bases its judgments on comparative research. This may explain why within Europe legal 
borrowing takes place on a larger scale than in other parts of the world. Of course, a common 
legal history is very helpful in this respect, and the role of academia should not be ignored 
either: the development of a European legal scholarship that we have witnessed since the 
beginning of the 1990s, has proven to be immensely useful for the courts. It has already been 
mentioned that it is often through legal literature that judges get to know about foreign 
solutions. 
There is also a fourth factor. Receptiveness towards foreign law may also have to do with the 
way in which the law in a country is formed. If this is on a case by case basis, as in common 
law countries, it is easier to refer to similar foreign case law than in countries where the law is 
primarily formed by statute. The reason for this is simply that it is easier for a judge to 
compare similar situations decided in foreign cases than to compare abstract statutes. Basil 
Markesinis puts it like this: 77 
The full benefit of comparing systems comes … when one compares factually equivalent litigated 
circumstances. The immediately obvious similarities encountered when one is comparing similar 
litigated situations makes the ‘foreign’ reader feel reassured by what he is discovering rather than put 
off.  
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This may indeed explain the influence of one common law country on another and also why 
civil law courts seem to refer more readily to foreign case law than to foreign legislation. It 
does not explain, however, the minor role of foreign case law in the American discussion. 
If Markesinis is right, this also casts doubts on the practical usefulness for courts of 
‘restatements’ such as the Principles of European Contract Law and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. These cannot take the place of reference to 
foreign case law. It is more likely that such principles can offer important guidance in the 
drafting of national legislation. Both in the recent modernization of the German law of 
obligations and in the drafting of the new Chinese Contract Code, the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts were cited. 
Again, these factors do not explain everything. There are many other, often more practical, 
factors which may determine the use of foreign law in domestic disputes. Knowledge of 
foreign languages, the availability of foreign material, intellectual curiosity, the time available 
to decide a case, and mere coincidence also play a role. If Markesinis had not advised counsel 
in White v. Jones to refer the Court to comparative materials, Lord Goff’s opinion would have 
looked different. More formal incentives play a role as well. Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code 
was often interpreted by Swiss courts as an invitation to incorporate foreign law in their 
decisions. Section 39 of the South African Constitution is even more explicit. 
VI.  Finally: The Influence of Comparative Reasoning on National Law 
The title of this chapter suggests an influence of comparative law on national legal systems. In 
the end, it is clear that such influence does exist, but also that it is often difficult to measure. 
One reason why the causal link between foreign and national law cannot easily be established 
is that it is not so much foreign law as such that is taken over by a national lawmaker or court, 
but the argument expressed in foreign legislation, or in a foreign court decision. That 
argument itself, however, is not specifically ‘foreign’: it has persuasive authority because of 
its inherent quality, not because it is used in another country. Whether there should be liability 
in tort for pure economic loss does not depend on English or French law allowing this, but on 
the substantive arguments in favour and against such a claim, arguments that may, of course, 
have been discussed in an enlightening way in a foreign case or explanatory memorandum. 
But when it comes down to weighing these arguments, every legal system has to make its own 
choice. In the McFarlane case, Lord Steyn puts it like this:78 ‘The discipline of comparative 
 - 23 - 
law does not aim at a poll of solutions adopted in different countries. It has the different and 
inestimable value of sharpening our focus on the weight of competing considerations.’ This 
means that the influence of comparative law in this type of case is, at most, one of finding 
inspiration in the process of weighing the arguments in favour or against a particular solution. 
This is different if comparative law is used in a normative way. A certain international 
consensus, or a foreign solution, as such is then used as an argument for adopting the same 
solution at the national level. In this situation, foreign law influences national law more 
directly. If the legislature or court explicitly states that it has made use of comparative 
arguments there is little doubt that there is influence, but the problem then is that it is difficult 
to establish exactly what this influence has led to. It is banal to state that that the foreign 
solution may have a very different impact on the legal system of the importing country.79 
Present-day Turkish private law is very different from Swiss private law, even though Turkey 
took over the Swiss Civil Code. This also means that, if one’s goal is to promote uniformity 
among legal systems (see supra, section IV.2.), the mere adoption of foreign law will not 
achieve this aim. One need not agree with Montesquieu’s famous statement that the laws of 
each nation ‘should be closely tailored to the people for whom they are made, so that it would 
be pure coincidence if the laws of one nation would meet the needs of another’;80 but it is 
clear that diverging legal cultures often do stand in the way of the unifying effect of legal 
borrowing. 
Despite these doubts about the unifying effect of recourse to foreign law, it is certain that the 
continuing Europeanization and globalization will lead to a further increase of comparative 
reasoning in the years to come. As a result, the store of legal arguments to be considered in 
deciding hard cases, or in drafting new legislation, will become more and more similar across 
the world. This is likely to lead to a higher quality of legislation and court decisions: 
important arguments are less likely to be overlooked. This alone should make the drawing of 
comparative inspiration an indispensable part of present-day legal practice. 
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